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VIEWPOINT
Was the AMT Effectively Repealed?
by Reed Shuldiner
Introduction
One of the frequently criticized features of 
pre-2018 tax law was the individual alternative 
minimum tax. Its repeal was called for by both 
candidate and President Trump, and it was 
repealed in the House version of the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) and in the original draft of 
the Senate bill. In the final version of the Senate 
bill, however, the AMT survived, albeit with an 
increased exemption and an increased threshold 
for the phaseout of the exemption. The conference 
agreement followed the Senate bill in retaining the 
AMT with the increased exemption, but with a 
further substantial increase in the phaseout 
threshold.
The new AMT is a much-defanged version of 
the old AMT. Under old law, in broad income 
ranges the AMT was structured relative to the 
regular tax such that little preference income was 
required to trigger the AMT, and in some cases it 
could be triggered by a taxpayer taking no more 
than the standard deduction and a minimum 
number of personal exemptions.1 By contrast, 
under the TCJA there is always a substantial 
cushion between the regular tax and the AMT, so 
substantial preference income is required to 
trigger the AMT.2 At the same time, the regular tax 
under the TCJA eliminates key preference items, 
including personal exemptions, the state and local 
tax deduction over $10,000, and miscellaneous 
itemized deductions over the 2 percent floor. The 
structural changes in the AMT combined with the 
reduction in potential preferences means that the 
AMT should cease to be of concern to all but a 
small number of taxpayers with unusual tax 
circumstances. Comparing the AMT under old 
and new law is useful not only for the light it 
sheds on current law, but also, given the 2025 
sunset in the TCJA, because the old AMT is 
scheduled to return.3 In a sense, one might think of 
old law as both old and future law.
AMT Overview and TCJA Amendments
The AMT was introduced in 1969 in response 
to concerns that some high-income taxpayers 
didn’t pay any federal income taxes.4 The idea of 
the AMT was to impose a lower rate on a broader 
base and thereby guarantee that high-income 
taxpayers paid a minimum amount of taxes. 
Lower-income taxpayers were kept out of the 
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1
See the discussion of head of household status below.
2
I use the term “alternative minimum taxable income” to refer to the 
taxable excess as defined in section 55(b)(1)(A). I use the terms 
“preferences” and “preference income” to refer interchangeably to all 
adjustments and tax preferences. See sections 56-58.
3
See, e.g., section 1(j) (limiting changes to the regular tax brackets to 
tax years beginning before January 1, 2026) and section 55(d)(4) (limiting 
changes to the AMT exemption to tax years beginning before January 1, 
2026).
4
For a history of the AMT, see Robert P. Harvey and Jerry Tempalski, 
“The Individual AMT: Why It Matters,” 50 Nat’l Tax J. 453-473 (1997). For 
a more recent look at the AMT, see Leonard E. Burman, “The Alternative 
Minimum Tax: Assault on the Middle Class,” Milkin Inst. Rev., at 12-23 
(Fourth Quarter 2007).
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AMT through an exemption. Although originally 
targeting high-income taxpayers — the original 
AMT targets earned more than $1.5 million in 
today’s dollars — over time the AMT began to 
affect more and more middle-income taxpayers. 
There were two primary reasons for the increased 
scope and changed focus of the AMT. First, the 
key structural provisions were not indexed for 
inflation.5 Second, tax rates were reduced for the 
regular tax without adequate corresponding 
adjustments to the AMT. The situation became 
acute with the Bush tax cuts in 2001, which 
significantly reduced rates for the regular tax 
while making only temporary and inadequate 
adjustments to the AMT.6
As a result of these factors, the number of 
taxpayers swept into the AMT began to rise sharply 
(see Figure 1). From 1987 to 2001, the number of 
taxpayers affected by the AMT increased on average 
by 21 percent a year, rising from 140,000 taxpayers to 
1.6 million taxpayers.7 After the Bush tax cuts, for the 
period 2001-2005, the annual rate of increase jumped 
to 41 percent. By 2005, 5 million taxpayers were 
subject to the AMT. Congress tinkered with the 
5
The unindexed provisions were the exemption amount, the 
phaseout threshold for the exemption, and the start of the 28 percent 
bracket. Indexing was added beginning in 2013 by section 104(b)(1) of 
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240). See section 
55(d)(4).
6
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(EGTRRA, P.L. 107-16). On the relationship between the Bush tax cuts 
and the AMT, see, e.g., Burman, supra note 4, at 18 (“The Bush 
administration and its allies understood at the time that the AMT would 
‘take back’ a significant portion of the tax cuts.”).
7
All figures are geometric averages based on the data source noted in 
Figure 1.
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AMT, particularly the exemption level, to slow the 
increase in the number of taxpayers subject to it. 
Finally, as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 2012, Congress enacted a so-called permanent fix, 
Table 1. AMT Preferences in 2012
Number of Taxpayers 
With AMT Preference 
(thousands)
Amount (millions 
of dollars)
Percentage of All 
Preferences
Taxable income from Form 1040 (including negative amounts) + AMT 
adjustments and preferences
4,407 $1,499,292
Preference Number of Taxpayers Dollars (in millions) Percentage
State and local tax deductions net of refunds 4,140 $141,130 63.77%
Personal exemptions 4,327 $49,312 22.28%
Miscellaneous deductions above the 2% floor 1,009 $22,376 10.11%
Standard deduction 206 $1,705 0.77%
Passive activity loss 589 $1,595 0.72%
Incentive stock options 13 $1,482 0.67%
Beneficiaries of estates 103 $1,308 0.59%
Medical deductions 178 $837 0.38%
Private activity bond interest 654 $803 0.36%
Regular tax NOLs net of AMT NOLs 21 $666 0.30%
Depletion 15 $434 0.20%
Post-1986 depreciation 585 $429 0.19%
Long-term contracts 2 $344 0.16%
Other and related 61 $323 0.15%
Loss limitations 162 $322 0.15%
Certain home-mortgage interest 47 $274 0.12%
Intangible drilling costs 2 $195 0.09%
Capital gains exclusion (section 1202) 6 $107 0.05%
Mining costs 8 $82 0.04%
R&E expenditures 1 $12 0.01%
Circulation expenses 1 $1 0.00%
Large partnerships — $1 0.00%
Installment sales 1 -$8 -0.00%
Investment interest 105 -$78 -0.04%
Undetermined -$955 -0.43%
Disposition of property 252 -$1,391 -0.63%
Total adjustments and preferences $221,306 100%
= AMTI 4,407 $1,720,598
Note: The table contains information on taxpayers who owe additional tax because of the AMT (including lost credits).
Source: Based on data available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/amt-preference-items-2002-2004-2012.
Underlying source: Office of Tax Analysis, Department of the Treasury (unpublished tabulation).
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further increasing the exemption level and indexing 
the AMT for inflation.8 These changes stabilized the 
number of taxpayers subject to the AMT. Thus, the 
projected number of taxpayers subject to the AMT 
for 2018 was 5.2 million, roughly the same as the 
number in 2005.9
The AMT broadens the tax base by adding 
back into income a series of tax preferences. Some 
of the preferences target what might be 
considered traditional business and high-income 
taxpayer loopholes. Examples include passive 
activity losses, incentive stock options, interest on 
private activity bonds, some accelerated 
depreciation, long-term contracts, intangible 
drilling costs, and mining exploration and 
development costs.10 Other preferences are more 
mundane personal deductions. For example, the 
AMT included the following personal deductions 
as tax preferences: (1) the SALT deduction; (2) 
personal exemptions; (3) miscellaneous itemized 
deductions in excess of the 2 percent floor; and (4) 
the standard deduction.11
Over time, as the AMT effectively shifted to 
upper-middle-income taxpayers, personal 
deductions made up the lion’s share of the tax 
preferences. As shown in Table 1, for 2012, the 
most recent year for which data is available, the 
SALT deduction alone accounted for 64 percent of 
all preferences. Personal exemptions accounted 
for another 22 percent, miscellaneous itemized 
deductions in excess of the 2 percent floor 10 
percent, and the standard deduction another 1 
percent.12 Taken together, personal deductions 
accounted for 97.4 percent of the preferences 
taken into account under the AMT. The AMT thus 
had lost its mooring as a tax on high earners using 
loopholes and had instead become a much-
disliked tax on families, particularly in high-tax 
states.13
During his campaign, candidate Trump called 
for the elimination of the AMT.14 Repeal was again 
promised when the “Big Six” group of Republican 
leaders — Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell of Kentucky, House Ways and Means 
Committee Chair Kevin Brady of Texas, House 
Speaker Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin, Senate 
Finance Committee Chair Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and then-
National Economic Council Director Gary Cohn 
— released their framework for tax reform,15 and 
repeal was in both the bill passed by the House 
and the original chairman’s mark in the Senate.16 
As the bill worked its way through the Senate, 
however, full repeal of the AMT was abandoned, 
presumably for revenue reasons.17 Instead, the bill 
passed by the Senate increased the AMT 
exemption for married taxpayers filing jointly 
from $86,200 to $109,400 (from $55,300 to $70,300 
for unmarried taxpayers and heads of household) 
and increased the threshold for the phaseout of 
the AMT exemption for married taxpayers filing 
jointly from $164,100 to $208,400 (from $123,100 to 
$156,300 for unmarried taxpayers and heads of 
household).18 The conference committee adopted 
a modified version of the Senate bill, increasing 
the exemption phaseout threshold substantially 
to $1 million for married taxpayers filing jointly 
($500,000 otherwise).19
The primary question asked in this article is 
what the significance is of the failure to repeal the 
AMT. I argue below that the combination of 
increasing the AMT exemption, raising the 
exemption phaseout threshold, and eliminating 
8
See supra note 5.
9
AMT taxpayers as a percentage of the U.S. population were 
projected to be slightly lower in 2018 than 2005.
10
See generally sections 56-58.
11
See section 56(b)(1).
12
I include in the category of personal deductions the disallowance of 
medical deductions between 10 percent and 7.5 percent and the 
disallowance of home equity interest, which accounted for 0.38 percent 
and 0.12 percent of all personal deductions, respectively.
13
See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, “Funny, They Don’t Look Like Fat 
Cats,” The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1999.
14
See, e.g., Jim Nunns et al., “An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Tax 
Plan,” Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Dec. 22, 2015).
15
See Big Six, “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code,” 
at 5 (Sept. 27, 2017).
16
See section 2001 of H.R. 1 as passed by the House on November 9, 
2017. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, “Description of the 
Chairman’s Mark of the ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’” JCX-51-17 (Nov. 9, 
2017).
17
Revenue estimates for the AMT provisions in the various bill stages 
are discussed below.
18
Section 12001 of the amendment to H.R. 1, as passed by the Senate 
on December 2, 2017. Married taxpayers filing separately aren’t 
discussed in this article, but the various amounts for married taxpayers 
filing separately are always half the amount for married taxpayers filing 
jointly. References to married taxpayers filing jointly include surviving 
spouses. References to unmarried individuals exclude surviving spouses 
and heads of household.
19
Section 12003, H.R. 1, as reported in H.R. Rep. No. 115-466. See 
section 55(d)(4).
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
VIEWPOINT
TAX NOTES, APRIL 23, 2018  499
many AMT preferences greatly reduces the 
impact of the AMT and returns it closer to its 
original conception as a limited tax on individuals 
with substantial preference income. To see this, it 
is necessary to look at each filing status separately.
The AMT for Married Taxpayers Filing Jointly
Whether a taxpayer is subject to the AMT 
depends, of course, on the AMT preferences to 
which the taxpayer is entitled under the regular 
tax. However, it also depends critically on the 
relative rate structure of the regular and 
alternative minimum taxes. The usual description 
of the AMT is that it has a broader base and lower 
rates, but that is not necessarily true. In significant 
ranges of income, the marginal rate under the 
AMT can exceed the marginal rate under the 
regular tax. Because the regular tax and the AMT 
use different definitions of taxable income, 
however, it is difficult to directly compare their 
rate structures. To do so, I assume a minimal set of 
AMT preferences and compare the marginal rates 
and total tax burdens under the regular and 
alternative minimum taxes. My base case is a 
married couple filing a joint return and taking the 
standard deduction. I assume the couple is not 
entitled to any credits and has no AMT 
preferences other than the standard deduction 
and (under current law) the personal 
exemptions.20 Figure 2 shows the marginal rates 
facing those taxpayers as a function of adjusted 
gross income — which is assumed to be the same 
under new and old law.21 Lines A and B indicate 
the regular tax, and lines C and D indicate the 
AMT. Lines A and C indicate old law, and lines B 
and D indicate new law. Old law reflects inflation 
adjustments through 2018. In other words, it is 
what old law would have been in 2018 if the TCJA 
hadn’t been enacted.22
Compare first lines A and B — the old and 
new regular taxes — noting that the horizontal 
axis is measured in AGI, not taxable income. As 
expected, marginal rates under new law (Line B) 
are always at or below marginal rates under old 
law (Line A), reflecting the general decline in 
marginal rates under the TCJA.23
Now compare lines C and D — the old and 
new AMTs. There are two major changes. First, 
Line D rises from zero to 26 percent to the right of 
Line C, reflecting the increase in the AMT 
exemption under new law.24 Second, compare the 
humps in lines C and D. The humps reflect the 
effective increase in marginal rates because of the 
phaseout of the AMT exemption. The exemption 
phases out at a rate of 25 cents on the dollar, 
effectively increasing the marginal rate by 6.5 or 7 
percentage points.25 The hump shifts to the right 
under new law because of the increase in the 
phaseout threshold from $164,100 to $1 million.26
In assessing the likelihood of a taxpayer being 
subject to the AMT, we must compare the lines A, 
B, C, and D with each other. First, consider old law 
— lines A and C. From $86,000 (the AMT 
exemption amount) to $320,000 (the start of the 
personal exemption phaseout under the regular 
tax), the marginal rate under the AMT exceeds the 
marginal rate under the regular tax. Of course, 
merely because the marginal rate under the AMT 
exceeds the marginal rate under the regular tax 
does not mean that the total AMT exceeds the 
regular tax. That depends on the cumulative area 
between the two lines and is difficult to determine 
from a graph of marginal rates, but Figure 2 does 
show that the story is more nuanced than the 
simple broad-base, low-rate description of the 
AMT.
What about under new law (lines B and D)? 
Under new law, there remains a region where 
20
My base case is minimal in the sense that it is the simplest case. It is 
not minimal in the sense of minimizing AMT preferences because the 
standard deduction itself is an AMT preference item. Section 56(b)(1)(E).
21
I also assume that the taxpayer is not entitled to take the 20 percent 
deduction for qualified business income and has no income entitled to 
the capital gains preference. See sections 199A (qualified business 
income deduction under new law) and 1(h) (capital gains preference 
under old and new law).
22
Inflation adjustments are from Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 IRB 489, 
issued by the IRS before the passage of the TCJA.
23
In lieu of the actual phaseout under section 151(d), I assume a 
smooth phaseout over $125,000 of AGI, which equals an increase in 
marginal rate of approximately 1.1 percent.
24
Compare section 55(d)(1) (AMT exemption under old law) as 
adjusted for inflation with section 55(d)(4) (AMT exemption under the 
TCJA).
25
Under new law, the entire phaseout is in the 28 percent bracket, 
leading to an incremental marginal rate of 7 percent (28 percent x 25 
percent). Under old law, the phaseout begins in the 26 percent bracket, 
and thus initially raises the marginal rate by 6.5 percent (26 percent x 25 
percent).
26
There is a third minor change in the AMT. While the TCJA did not 
directly change the start of the 28 percent bracket in section 55, it did 
change the method by which the 28 percent bracket is adjusted for 
inflation. As a result, under new law the 28 percent bracket starts at 
$191,100 rather than $191,500.
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Line D is above Line B — that is, an area where the 
marginal rate under the AMT exceeds the 
marginal rate under the regular tax. That region, 
however, has shifted to the right, now extending 
from $109,400 (the AMT exemption level) to 
$339,000 (the start of the regular tax 32 percent 
bracket). By shifting to the right the region where 
the AMT rate exceeds the regular tax, the TCJA 
makes it less likely that the AMT will be binding 
on the taxpayer.27
Although looking at marginal rates is 
informative, ultimately what must be compared 
are total tax liabilities, not marginal rates. Total 
tax liabilities are compared in Figure 3. As in 
Figure 2, lines A and B are used for the regular tax 
and lines C and D for the AMT. Lines B and D are 
used for the new law, and lines A and C are used 
for the old laws. The other lines are explained 
below.
As before, first compare lines A and B 
representing the old and new regular tax, 
respectively. As expected, Line B lies strictly 
below Line A, indicating a tax cut at all income 
levels for which tax was due.28 Similarly Line D 
(new AMT) is below Line C (old AMT), at least 
until an AGI of $1,437,600, at which point the 
exemption in the new AMT has been fully phased 
out and the two taxes are practically identical.29
Now compare lines A and C, the old regular 
and old alternative minimum taxes. What is 
27
By shifting the region where the AMT rate exceeds the regular tax 
rate to the right, the TCJA expands the initial region where the regular 
tax rate exceeds the AMT rate.
28
Of course, the conclusion that the total tax liability is always less 
under new law holds only given my assumptions. For example, if the 
taxpayer had large SALT deductions, the tax could easily be greater 
under new law. All I have shown is that for a married couple filing 
jointly, the increase in the standard deduction and the revisions to the 
brackets more than make up for the loss of the personal exemptions.
29
The new AMT is $8 greater than the old AMT because the 28 
percent bracket starts at $191,100 rather than $191,500, which has the 
effect of taxing the difference, $400, at an extra 2 percent rate. See supra 
note 26.
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striking is that for a significant region, from about 
$300,000 to $500,000 of AGI, the two lines are 
difficult to separate. In other words, without any 
preferences other than the standard deduction 
and the personal exemptions, the AMT is roughly 
the same as the regular tax. As a result, if 
taxpayers in this region have any significant 
additional preference income, they are quickly 
subject to the AMT.
To see this more clearly, lines E and F show 
what I call the AMT cushion. I define the AMT 
cushion as the excess of the regular tax over the 
AMT as a percentage of the regular tax.30 The scale 
for the AMT cushion is shown on the right axis. At 
any given AGI, the larger the cushion, the greater 
the amount of preference income required to 
subject the taxpayer to the AMT. If the cushion is 
small, only a small amount of preference income 
is required to trigger the AMT. If the cushion is 
less than zero, the taxpayer is subject to the AMT.
As can be seen from Line E in Figure 3, the 
AMT cushion is U-shaped. It initially plummets 
as AGI rises, flattens out, rises again sharply, and 
eventually levels off. What is striking about the 
graph is that the cushion is quite small for a 
substantial range of income. In particular, the 
cushion is less than 5 percent for AGI between 
about $250,000 and $560,000, and drops as low as 
1 percent from about $320,000 to $500,000. Over 
this range, the difference between the two taxes is 
razor thin.
For example, as little in additional AMT 
preferences as a third personal exemption would 
be enough to subject the taxpayers in my example 
to the AMT over the region of roughly $290,000 to 
$370,000. Figure 3 makes clear why so many 
taxpayers were subject to the AMT under old law 
and that the primary target of the AMT was 
taxpayers roughly in the range of $250,000 to 30
AMT cushion = (regular tax - AMT)/(regular tax).
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$500,000 of income. Those taxpayers are well-off 
by any reasonable measure, but a far cry from the 
original targets of the AMT who earned over $1.5 
million in today’s dollars. By contrast, for 
taxpayers with AGI over $1 million, the cushion 
starts at 17.6 percent and increases gradually 
toward 29.3 percent.31 Thus, under old law, very 
high-income taxpayers were subject to the AMT 
only if they had large amounts of preference 
income.32 At the same time, taxpayers with 
incomes between roughly $250,000 and $500,000 
were often caught in what might be called the 
AMT trap — the U-shaped region shown in 
Figure 3.
What about under new law? In comparing 
lines B and D in Figure 3, it’s clear that under new 
law there is generally more separation between 
the regular and alternative minimum taxes. The 
separation can be seen more clearly by looking at 
Line F, which shows the cushion between the 
regular and alternative minimum taxes under 
new law. For incomes under $1 million (when the 
AMT exemption begins to phase out), Line F lies 
well above Line E. Its minimum is about 6 percent, 
and given its sharp V shape, it is at its minimum 
only at a single point and then rises steeply.33 That 
contrasts starkly with old law, under which the 
AMT cushion was 5 percent or less for a range of 
over $400,000 of AGI. Thus, the AMT trap has 
been substantially reduced. Starting at $1 million, 
the cushion shrinks from a peak of about 18 
percent to a trough of about 14 percent as the 
AMT exemption phases out. Once the exemption 
is fully phased out at $1,437,600, the cushion rises 
toward its asymptote of 24.3 percent.34 The 
asymptote under new law is less than the 
asymptote under old law because of the decline in 
the regular tax top bracket from 39.6 percent to 37 
percent without a concomitant decline in the 
AMT top bracket.
It’s clear, therefore, simply by comparing the 
AMT cushion under old and new law, that the 
structure of the AMT under new law substantially 
reduces the impact of the AMT. What about AMT 
preferences? Will there likely be an increase in 
AMT preferences that will offset the structural 
advantages of the revised AMT? To the contrary, 
there will likely be a substantial decrease in 
preference income under new law. The most 
significant change is the $10,000 cap on the SALT 
deduction, which as shown in Table 1 accounted 
for over 60 percent of preferences in 2012.35 Of 
course, the capped SALT deduction is still a 
preference item, but as I argue below, it alone 
could never be sufficient to subject a taxpayer to 
the AMT.
The TCJA also eliminates personal 
exemptions and miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, which together accounted for over 30 
percent of preferences in 2012.36 Finally, although 
of much less empirical importance, the TCJA 
eliminated the deduction for interest on home 
equity indebtedness, thus further reducing 
potential AMT preferences. Of course, the TCJA 
substantially increases the standard deduction, 
which is also a preference item under the AMT. 
The increased standard deduction, however, has 
been fully accounted for in Figure 3.
At the AMT marginal rate of 26 or 28 percent, 
the $10,000 SALT deduction under the TCJA 
would increase the AMT by $2,600 or $2,800. 
Although unclear from Figure 3, the gap between 
the regular and alternative minimum taxes (in the 
31
For very high incomes, the AMT approaches a flat tax at 28 percent, 
and the regular tax approaches a flat tax at 39.6 percent. The AMT 
cushion, therefore, approaches 29.3 percent ((39.6 percent - 28 percent)/
39.6 percent) asymptotically.
32
Given their phaseout, personal exemptions could not be a source of 
preference income. Also, given the amount of preference income 
required, it is unlikely that state and local taxes alone could generate 
enough preference income to trigger the AMT.
33
The minimum point is at an AGI of $339,000, which, given the 
$24,000 standard deduction, gives a taxable income of $315,000. At that 
point, the marginal rate on the regular tax jumps from 24 percent to 32 
percent as compared with an AMT marginal rate of 28 percent.
34
For very high incomes, the AMT approaches a flat tax at 28 percent 
and the regular tax approaches a flat tax at 37 percent. The AMT 
cushion, therefore, approaches 24.3 percent ((37 percent - 28 percent)/37 
percent). Cf. note 31.
35
See section 174(b)(6) (imposing $10,000 cap on SALT deductions).
36
The old regular tax permitted miscellaneous itemized deductions 
only to the extent they exceeded 2 percent of AGI. Section 67. The AMT 
preference item, therefore, was the excess of those deductions over the 
floor. Under new law, the deductions are entirely disallowed. See section 
67(g).
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range where the AMT is positive) is as small as 
$3,721. Adding a preference item of $10,000 at a 26 
or 28 percent tax rate would thus appear to 
substantially eliminate the gap between the AMT 
and the regular tax, making it much more likely 
that other preference items would make the 
taxpayer subject to the AMT.37
The problem with this analysis is that it is 
inconsistent with the assumption that the 
taxpayer takes the standard deduction. To take a 
SALT deduction, a taxpayer must itemize 
deductions.38 And if the taxpayer itemizes, the 
taxpayer cannot also take the standard deduction. 
Thus, a taxpaying couple can have a $10,000 SALT 
preference only if they don’t have a $24,000 
standard deduction preference. The effect of 
taking a $10,000 SALT deduction, therefore, is to 
reduce AMT preferences by $14,000. In other 
words, taking the SALT deduction makes a 
taxpayer less likely to be subject to the AMT. 
Consider again Figure 3. Line G shows the AMT 
cushion assuming the taxpayers have itemized 
deductions of $24,000, including $10,000 in SALT 
deductions and $14,000 in non-preference 
deductions. As expected, the AMT cushion with 
the SALT deduction (Line G) lies strictly above the 
AMT cushion with the standard deduction (Line 
F). In particular, assuming the SALT deduction 
doubles the minimum AMT cushion from about 6 
percent to about 12 percent.
The AMT for Unmarried Taxpayers
The analysis above is limited to married 
taxpayers filing jointly. This part provides a 
parallel analysis for individuals filing as 
unmarried, and the next part does so for 
individuals filing as head of household. Figure 4 
provides the same information as Figure 3, but 
assumes an unmarried taxpayer with (under old 
law) a single personal exemption. Consider first 
the change to the regular tax for unmarried 
taxpayers by comparing Line A (old regular tax) 
and Line B (new regular tax). While Line B is 
always below Line A, the two lines are closer 
together in Figure 4 than in Figure 3. The 
closeness of the lines indicates that at least in 
some regions, the tax cut given by the TCJA to 
unmarried individuals was less generous than the 
tax cut for married couples. In particular, under 
new law the 35 percent bracket starts at a taxable 
income of $200,000, while under old law the 35 
percent bracket does not start until $424,950. An 
unmarried taxpayer with AGI of $431,450 and 
taking the standard deduction under both old and 
new law would save only $807 under the new law, 
a reduction in taxes of only 0.65 percent. The fact 
that the TCJA is less generous to unmarried 
individuals is the flip side of the fact that it 
eliminated the marriage penalty for the regular 
tax in all but the top bracket.39 As discussed below, 
Congress took the opposite tack with the AMT.
In terms of the bite of the AMT under old law, 
Figure 4 tells a story that is qualitatively similar to 
the case of married filing jointly taxpayers. To see 
this, compare lines A and C (the regular and 
alternative minimum taxes under old law) as 
summarized by the again U-shaped Line E (the 
AMT cushion under old law). For unmarried 
taxpayers, there is a substantial region under old 
law where the AMT cushion is less than 5 percent 
(corresponding to an AGI of roughly $235,000 to 
$425,000). The cushion reaches a minimum of 
about 1.6 percent at an AGI of around $345,000. 
Under old law, the addition of as few as two 
personal exemptions would be sufficient to 
subject a taxpayer with AGI in the range of about 
$240,000 to $310,000 to the AMT.40
By contrast, under new law the U-shaped 
AMT trap has essentially disappeared. The 
37
A $10,000 preference would reduce the minimum cushion from 5.8 
percent to 1.4 percent.
38
See sections 62 and 63.
39
The marriage penalty is eliminated when married filing jointly 
brackets are twice unmarried brackets. Previously, the marriage penalty 
had been eliminated only for the 10 and 15 percent brackets and the 
standard deduction. See section 1(f)(8) (15 percent bracket), 1(i)(B) (10 
percent bracket), and 64(c)(2) (standard deduction) as modified by 
EGTRRA, sections 302(a), 101(a), and 301(a), respectively). The TCJA 
extended the marriage penalty elimination to all but the top bracket. 
Compare section 1(j)(2)(A) with section 1(j)(2)(C). The top bracket for 
unmarried individuals begins at $500,000 under the TCJA, while for 
married taxpayers filing jointly it begins at $600,000, only 120 percent of 
the unmarried level. Moving in the other direction, the TCJA introduced 
a new marriage penalty in the cap on the SALT deduction. An 
unmarried couple can deduct a total of $20,000 in state and local taxes. If 
they are married, their deduction is capped at $10,000. See section 
164(b)(6)(B). The maximum marriage penalty as a result of the start of 
the 37 percent bracket is $8,000 ($400,000 * (37 percent - 35 percent)). The 
cap on SALT deductions adds a potential marriage penalty of up to 
$3,700 ($10,000 x 37 percent).
40
An unmarried individual with more than one exemption might, 
but would not necessarily, qualify for head of household status. See 
section 2(b). Head of household status is discussed below.
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
VIEWPOINT
504  TAX NOTES, APRIL 23, 2018
minimum cushion for AGI less than $500,000 — 
where the trap used to be — is more than 19 
percent.41 The overall minimum cushion of 
approximately 14 percent is reached at $781,200 
when the AMT exemption is fully phased out.42 
The AMT trap is smaller (the AMT cushion is 
generally greater) for unmarried taxpayers than 
for married taxpayers under new law because the 
marriage penalty has been eliminated under the 
regular tax, while being maintained under the 
AMT. In other words, the treatment of unmarried 
individuals is relatively harsh under the regular 
tax and relatively lenient under the AMT, thereby 
increasing the gap between the two taxes.
The AMT marriage penalty arises from both 
the AMT exemption and the start of the 28 percent 
bracket. The married AMT exemption amount, 
$109,400, is only 156 percent (rather than 200 
percent) of the unmarried exemption, $70,300, 
and the 28 percent bracket starts at $191,100 for 
both married and unmarried taxpayers. On the 
other hand, the start of the phaseout for married 
filers, $1 million, is 200 percent of the unmarried 
threshold, $500,000, so no further marriage 
penalty is created by the phaseout threshold. The 
flip side of a marriage penalty is, of course, a 
single’s bonus. It is this single’s bonus in the AMT 
with no corresponding single’s bonus for the 
regular tax that explains why the AMT is less 
binding on unmarried than on married taxpayers 
under new law.
41
The cushion reaches a local minimum of approximately 19.4 
percent at an AGI of about $210,000.
42
For an unmarried individual, the exemption is set at $70,300 and 
phases out between an AGI of $500,000 and $781,200. See section 
55(d)(4).
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The AMT for Head of Household Taxpayers
The final filing status that should be 
considered is head of household.43 For my base 
case, I assume the taxpayer takes the standard 
deduction and, under old law, two personal 
exemptions: one for the taxpayer and one for the 
required dependent.44 I assume the dependent is 
eligible for the child tax credit under both old and 
new law.45 The results are shown in Figure 5.
Consider first the AMT under old law. 
Comparing Line C (AMT) and Line A (regular 
tax), it’s clear that the AMT line lies above the 
regular tax line over a substantial range, 
indicating that in the base case the AMT is 
binding. The binding nature of the AMT can also 
be seen by looking at the AMT cushion shown by 
Line E. Once again, the AMT cushion is U-shaped 
with a large region from about $145,000 to 
$490,000 of AGI that is less than 5 percent. This 
time, however, there is a significant region, from 
about $167,000 to $405,000, where the cushion is 
negative, meaning that the taxpayer would be 
subject to the AMT regardless of preferences other 
than the standard deduction and the two personal 
exemptions. Although the values shown on the 
graph are truncated at zero, the largest negative 
cushion (in percentage terms) is at an AGI of 
about $235,000, where the cushion is negative 6.6 
percent, representing an AMT of about $3,300 
over the regular tax. The obvious question is, why 
does the AMT cushion drop under head of 
43
Head of household status is defined in section 2(b) as an unmarried 
individual who maintains his home as a household for a dependent or 
maintains a household for a parent who is a dependent.
44
Under old law, the standard deduction for a head of household is 
$9,550 for 2018. Under new law, it is $18,000. Compare section 63(c)(2)(B) 
with section 63(c)(7)(i).
45
See section 24(a) ($1,000 child credit under old law) and section 
24(h)(2) ($2,000 child credit under new law). Since the credit is not an 
AMT preference, including the credit has no effect on the gap between 
the AMT and the regular tax. Including the credit does increase the AMT 
cushion because the cushion is defined as the gap divided by the regular 
tax.
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household status relative to unmarried status? 
The answer is simple: The benefits of head of 
household status apply only to the regular tax and 
not to the AMT. Thus, relative to an unmarried 
individual, the larger standard deduction and the 
additional personal exemption are both 
additional preference items. Moreover, the more 
favorable head of household rate structure acts 
like an implicit AMT preference.
To put this result in context, it is worth making 
two points. First, although there is a substantial 
range of AGI for which the base case is subject to 
the AMT under old law, there are relatively few 
taxpayers who file as head of household and have 
income in that range. Based on 2015 data, the most 
recent year available, roughly 15 percent of tax 
returns are filed as head of household. Of those 
filing as head of household, only about 0.6 percent 
report AGI in the range of $200,000 to $500,000. 
This means that only 0.09 percent of taxpayers, or 
about 135,000 individuals, file returns that are 
likely to fall into this particular AMT trap.46 Of 
course, just because few taxpayers are affected 
does not mean it is sensible from a policy 
perspective. If, for example, it is believed that 
head of household benefits should be phased out 
for high-income taxpayers, it does not explain 
why the AMT should be designed to take away 
those benefits from taxpayers in the $200,000 to 
$500,000 range but not from those earning more 
than $500,000. It is also worth noting that when 
originally enacted, the AMT covered only 140,000 
taxpayers, about the same number of taxpayers 
who are likely to be affected by this AMT trap.47
Second, as discussed above, since the 
standard deduction is an AMT preference, a 
taxpayer who itemizes can have reduced 
preferences. Consider, for example, a taxpayer 
who has itemized deductions equal to the 
standard deduction, all of which are non-
preference items (for example, charitable 
deductions and qualified housing interest). Such a 
taxpayer would have the same taxable income for 
the regular tax as a taxpayer taking the standard 
deduction, but her income subject to the AMT 
would be reduced by $9,550, the amount of the 
standard deduction. Even then, however, that 
taxpayer would be subject to the AMT over the 
AGI region of approximately $225,000 to $370,000.
Under new law, however, the AMT trap 
shrinks substantially. As with married taxpayers 
filing jointly, the AMT cushion has a distinct V 
shape. The minimum cushion is 10.9 percent at 
$175,500 and rises steeply in both directions. This 
relatively generous cushion is attributable to the 
increased AMT exemption that along with the 
irrelevance of personal exemptions outweighs the 
loss of the increased standard deduction and 
special head of household brackets.
In summary, whether filing as unmarried or 
head of household, individual taxpayers are much 
less likely to be subject to the AMT under new law 
than under old law. Moreover, given the cap on 
SALT deductions, the repeal of personal 
exemptions, and the nondeductibility of all 
miscellaneous itemized deductions under the new 
regular tax, taxpayers who are subject to the AMT 
are likely to look a lot more like the original intended 
targets of the tax. They are likely to be very high-
income taxpayers taking advantage of tax 
provisions that look more like traditional loopholes.
Scoring the AMT Change
The analysis above is abstract in the sense that 
for the most part it is based on the law, but not on 
the application of actual taxpayer data to that law. 
It will be a few years before we have data on the 
number and types of taxpayers affected by the 
AMT under new law. We do, however, have a 
source of predictions based on historical taxpayer 
data. As part of the legislative process leading up 
to the enactment of the TCJA, the Joint Committee 
on Taxation provided revenue estimates both for 
AMT repeal and for retaining the AMT with 
increased exemptions and thresholds. By 
comparing those revenue estimates, or scores, we 
can learn something about what the revenue 
estimators thought of the revised AMT based on 
existing taxpayer data.
Table 2 shows a selection of revenue estimates 
from the legislation at different points in the 
legislative process. The House bill, which provided 
for full repeal of the individual AMT, was scored at 
$72.8 billion for the first full year and $695.5 billion 
over 10 years. To put that figure in perspective, the 
46
Computations are based on IRS Statistics of Income division, 
“Individual Income Tax Returns (Complete Report),” Publication 1304, 
Table 1.2 (Sept. 2017).
47
See supra note 7.
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overall 10-year cost of the individual portions of the 
bill was $963.7 billion. Thus, AMT repeal accounted 
for some 72 percent of the overall cost of the bill. 
That figure is deceptive, however. In particular, it 
doesn’t mean that the AMT was raising that much 
revenue under old law. To the contrary, the Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center estimated that under 
old law, the AMT was expected to raise $39 billion in 
calendar year 2018 and $492 billion over the 2018-
2027 period. In other words, the revenue estimate 
for repeal was about 85 percent higher for the first 
year and about 40 percent higher over 10 years than 
the estimated revenue generated by the AMT.48 The 
explanation for this discrepancy is presumably that 
AMT repeal was scored after scoring the other 
individual provisions, including the rate changes 
and the increased standard deduction. In other 
words, it was an estimate of the bite of the old AMT 
relative to the new regular tax. That in turn explains 
why the revenue estimate for the chairman’s mark 
(the first Senate draft), which also provided for full 
repeal, is a little higher (about 2 percent) than the 
House score. As the bill became more generous, the 
cost of AMT repeal relative to the new baseline 
increased. In turn, the second Senate draft, the 
chairman’s modification to the chairman’s mark, 
was more generous in its individual provisions, 
leading to a one-year estimate for AMT repeal of $97 
billion, a 31 percent increase over the chairman’s 
mark.49 At the same time, the 10-year estimate rose 
only by 9 percent, reflecting the newly introduced 
eight-year sunset of the bill’s individual provisions.50
48
The Tax Policy Center estimates are based on calendar years, and 
the JCT estimates are based on fiscal years, so they are not strictly 
comparable.
49
JCT, “Description of the Chairman’s Modification to the Chairman’s 
Mark of the ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’” JCX-56-17 (Nov. 14, 2017).
50
In general, in the chairman’s modification to the chairman’s mark 
and in subsequent drafts, the bill’s individual provisions sunset after 
2025.
Table 2. Revenue Estimates for TCJA Individual AMT Provisions
Legislative Status Description
1st Full 
Year 10-Year
Total 
Individual 
Provisions
10-Year AMT as 
Percentage of 
Total Individual
House bill Full repeal $72.8 $695.5 $963.7 72%
Senate — Chairman’s mark Full repeal $74.3 $706.7 $902.9 78%
Senate — Chairman’s 
modification to the 
Chairman’s mark
Full repeal with sunset $97.2 $769.1 $885.9 87%
Senate bill Exemption increased to 
$109,400/$70,300; 
threshold increased to 
$208,400/$156,300
$82.0 $636.2 $1021.3 62%
Conference agreement Exemption increased to 
$109,400/$70,300; 
threshold increased to 
$1,000,000/$500,000
$82.5 $637.1 $1,126.6 57%
Old law Estimated AMT revenues 
before passage of TCJA
$39.1 $492.4 n/a n/a
All estimates are in billions of dollars.
Rows 1-5 show fiscal-year estimates from the JCT.
Sources: JCX-54-17, JCX-52-17, JCX-57-17, JCX-63-17, & H. R. Rep. No. 115-466, respectively.
Row 6 shows calendar-year estimates from the Tax Policy Center.
Source: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/baseline-alternative-minimum-tax-amt-tables-april-2017/t17-0145-
aggregate-amt.
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The Senate bill and the subsequent conference 
agreement abandoned AMT repeal, and as 
discussed above, substituted a scaled-back AMT 
with an increased AMT exemption and phaseout 
threshold. Both were scored similarly.51 The 
revenue cost for the AMT changes in the 
conference agreement was $82.5 billion in the first 
full year and $637.1 billion over 10 years (taking 
into account the sunset). The one-year figure of 
$82.5 billion is about 85 percent of the one-year 
cost of full repeal in the chairman’s modification 
— $97.2 billion. The relative costs suggest that the 
increase in the exemption and threshold were 
viewed as making substantial progress toward 
repeal. Thus, the revenue estimates support the 
argument that the AMT has been substantially 
tamed by the TCJA — at least until 2026 when the 
new law becomes old law and old law becomes 
new law once again. 
51
A separate question not addressed is why these scores were so 
similar given that the Senate bill had an exemption phaseout threshold 
of $208,400 for married taxpayers filing jointly and $156,300 for 
unmarried taxpayers, while the conference bill had a much greater 
exemption phaseout threshold of $1 million for married taxpayers filing 
jointly and $500,000 for unmarried taxpayers.
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